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Abstract
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, focusing on unemployment insurance schemes, the
article seeks to identify the development of social rights and obligations in four countries (France,
Germany, Portugal and Spain), representative of the conservative regime, over the period 1991–
2006. Second, the article aims to verify whether or not there was a common reform trajectory in time
as well as in space, given the already known divergence over the appropriateness of classifying
Mediterranean countries within the framework of a specific regime.
Based on analysis of 25 legislative changes concerning entitlement and eligibility criteria, the study
presents three major findings. First, the four insurance schemes reveal a new balance between
(weaker) social rights and (stronger) obligations, which may indicate a trend toward a
re-commodification of work. Second, Portugal adopted a specific trajectory while the Spanish reform
process more closely resembled that carried out by France and Germany. Finally, two waves of
reform may be identified: first, between 1991 and 1997 and justified by cost-containment concerns
and, subsequently, from 2001 onwards, associated with a stronger recalibration of benefit rights.
Keywords
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Since the mid-1990s, a large body of literature has been devoted to analysis of
welfare state reform, particularly in Western Europe, by virtue of the impor-
tant challenges shared to a greater or lesser extent by all countries. External
pressures (globalization) and/or internal pressures (especially ageing popula-
tions, slower economic growth, high and persistent unemployment and
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European monetary-related constraints on public spending) have been iden-
tified as the major drivers of social change (e.g. Ferrera and Rhodes 2000;
Kuhnle 2000; Huber and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001a; Powell and Hewitt
2002; Castles 2004; Kittel and Winner 2005).
For more than a decade, the interest of many researchers has been focused
on the nature and degree of welfare change, particularly old-age pensions and
health care as the two major programmes in terms of coverage and expendi-
ture. In addition, some researchers have also attempted to identify differences
in the dynamics of reforms enacted in different welfare regimes.
Despite the reforms undertaken in all EU countries since the 1980s, unem-
ployment protection has attracted the attention of few researchers (e.g. Clasen
et al. 2001; Clasen and Clegg 2006; Clegg 2007). Not only is this the third
largest social programme in many European welfare states, especially during
periods of high and persistent unemployment, but such state expenditure has
also commonly been subject to several criticisms. Beyond the twofold negative
effect on public expenditure and revenue, many critics of this social pro-
gramme point to potential work disincentives: the easier to access and the
more generous the benefits, the greater its effect on the length of time spent
unemployed and, therefore, the greater the level of state dependency.
In itself, this kind of criticism cannot explain the lower popularity of this
social programme but such a prevailing opinion may have had some influence
over the nature of reforms implemented in the last decade (Kvist 1998, 2000;
OECD 2000; Zimmermann 2006). More specifically, if we assume a reduction
in the depth and breadth of such polices was a priority in restructuring
unemployment protection, then policy measures may be expected to reflect
this option. Thus, it is expected that governments chose to make access stricter
and/or reinforce claimant obligations rather than reduce levels of benefit
payments – by changes in earnings references, replacement rates and the
incidence of taxation. Where the former represent the options taken, then we
might accept that unemployment protection reform resulted in a new balance
between (weaker) rights and (stronger) obligations.
In order to verify the validity of this hypothesis, the present article analyses
the reform of unemployment insurance schemes in Germany, France, Portu-
gal and Spain, as representative of the conservative regime, for the period
1991–2006. We analyze 25 legislative changes concerning eligibility and
entitlement criteria as stipulated in legislation in the four countries. Given the
well-known divergence over the classification of Mediterranean countries, the
selection of Portugal and Spain – two less frequently studied countries –
enables us to verify whether or not the reform process followed a specific and
shared trajectory. Furthermore, our objectives also include verifying whether
there was a common reform trajectory in time or, on the contrary, the process
of reform confirms the two main waves identified by some authors (e.g. Palier
2007; Palier and Martin 2007).
The structure of the article is as follows. In the next section, we briefly
discuss three topics: the reasons for unemployment protection reform, the
instruments and trajectory over time; the classification of the four countries in
accordance with their respective welfare regime and, finally, the selection of
the most appropriate indicators. The second section identifies the legislative
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changes between 1991 and 2006 according to each rule on eligibility and
entitlement and by country. The third section provides a brief analysis of the
direction of all changes in the four countries before the fourth section discusses
our conclusions.
Analysis of Unemployment Protection Reform
Reasons for reform and the trajectory in time
For a long time, empirical research across European countries focused mainly
on retirement pensions as the major social programme in both financial terms
and beneficiary numbers (e.g. Myles and Quadagno 1997; Taylor-Gooby
1999; Bonoli 2003; Schludi 2005; Bonoli and Palier 2007; Jochem 2007). More
recently, unemployment protection reform across a group of European coun-
tries has also become the analytical focus of some empirical studies (e.g.
Clasen et al. 2001; Clasen and Clegg 2006; Clegg 2007).
Despite being a social programme with more restricted coverage, and
therefore much less expensive when compared with old-age pensions, unem-
ployment protection has also been the subject of substantial legislative changes
in all western European countries over the last two decades.
Three motives serve to explain the political option of reforming unemploy-
ment protection. First, there is an important economic argument insofar as
persistently high unemployment has a twofold negative effect on public
budgets by increasing social expenditure and lowering tax and/or social
contribution revenues (Clasen 2000). A second motive takes into account the
social limits of traditional unemployment insurance schemes within the
context of new labour market conditions, namely, atypical forms of working
and long-term unemployment (Clasen and Clegg 2006). Although these two
reasons may be sufficient to explain changes in eligibility and entitlement
rules, we believe that the neo-liberal thesis concerning beneficiary behaviour
may have been decisive. As several authors point out (Kvist 1998; OECD
2000; Scruggs 2006), this social programme is usually criticized for its potential
work disincentives: the easier it is to access and the more generous the benefits,
the greater its potential effect on the length of time spent unemployed and,
therefore, the greater the dependency on the state.
This kind of criticism helps in explaining the lower popularity of this social
programme. According to Taylor-Gooby (2001: 139), a selective programme
such as unemployment protection has, in contrast with those providing com-
prehensive coverage (such as old-age pension schemes), less public support
which can be explained by the perception that such benefits ‘are less legiti-
mate, or because they command a weaker constituency of self-interest’.1 Thus,
instead of a blame-avoidance strategy designed to minimize the impact on
public opinion (Pierson 2001b), unemployment protection reform may be seen
as a way for governments to obtain credit-claiming (Clasen 2000: 108). Thus,
any reform that focuses on integrating unemployed persons into the labour
market might be expected to gain the public support of tax-payers.
These three reasons, taken together, may justify the two dimensions of the
reform agenda in the European countries identified by Clegg (2006: 7–6):
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cost-containment (realized through cuts in levels and/or duration of benefits,
and/or stricter eligibility criteria) and the recalibration of benefit rights (realized
through measures such as safeguarding protection for those with atypical work
histories, reducing protection even for those with long working histories and
more contribution-based benefit entitlements). However, the ‘precise mix of
the different measures of course varies in space and time’ (Clegg 2006: 7).
Regarding the process of reform over time, more precisely since 1990,
several authors (e.g. Palier 2007; Palier and Martin 2007; Hemerijck and
Eichhorst 2009) identified two main stages to welfare state reform: a first wave
of retrenchment in the early 1990s and a second wave of more path-breaking
changes in the 2000s.
The first is associated both with the economic downturn in the 1991–93
period and with the adoption of the Maastricht criteria in 1993. This eco-
nomic and political context would justify several measures aimed at control-
ling social expenditure in the fields of pensions, health care and
unemployment. The second wave of reforms targeted not only containing
social benefits but also implementing more structural changes, such as the
introduction of funded pension schemes, the privatization of health-care
systems and the activation of the unemployed persons (Palier and Martin
2007: 543).
Taking these arguments into account, we intend verify whether these two
waves have been observable in the trajectories of unemployment reform
undertaken in our four selected countries.
The continental and Mediterranean countries: one or two welfare regimes?
Following the line of research adopted by several authors in recent years, our
four-country (France, Germany, Portugal and Spain) comparative analysis
takes the welfare regime approach as its theoretical background.
One obvious question concerns the classification of these countries, given
the intense academic debate launched by the publication of The Three Worlds
of Welfare Capitalism by Esping-Andersen (1990), which remains a point of
reference work despite the diverse subsequent critiques (see Powell and Bar-
rientos 2011).
There is a consensus on classifying France and Germany within the same
welfare regime, despite the different names attributed: conservative (Esping-
Andersen 1990), Bismarckian (Ferrera 1996), or continental (Bonoli 1997).
This does not hold for the classification of Portugal and Spain, as well as for
the other two Mediterranean countries.
Indeed, one field of criticism of the ‘three worlds’ deals with the incorrect
classification of certain countries, particularly, Italy. The proposal of a fourth
regime to encompass the four Mediterranean countries resulted in the pre-
sentation of new typologies (e.g. Leibfried 1992; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997).
This specific regime was justified by two main reasons:
1. the role of the family as the major social protection provider; and
2. substantial variations in the quality of social protection arrangements
across fields of social policy.
Social Policy & Administration, Vol. 46, No. 1, February 2012
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.4
In Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies, Esping-Andersen (1999)
acknowledged how Mediterranean countries presented characteristics not
entirely compatible with his ‘three worlds’ and argued that establishing a
specific regime would depend principally on the role of the family in the
welfare mix. To this end, Esping-Andersen identifies and assesses two dimen-
sions to familialism (public policies aimed at families and the welfare burden
assumed by the latter), arguing that Spain, Portugal and Italy (Greece was
excluded) do not justify classification under a specific regime, given these
countries display no significant differences when compared with other conti-
nental European countries, namely, France and Germany (Esping-Andersen
1999: 93).
Relating the aforementioned polarization of their material coverage,
including serious gaps in protection, we argue this can only be explained
by pointing to the lower level of welfare state development (EC 1993;
Katrougalos 1996; Vogel 2003; Arcanjo 2006). Moreover, developments
observed in Greece, Portugal and Spain in recent decades ‘indicate remark-
able progress from rudimentary to some of fully fletched welfare states’ (Palme
et al. 2009: 24).
However, this question remains unresolved by empirical studies: some
backing the existence of a specific regime (e.g. Kautto 2002; Saint Arnaud and
Bernard 2003; Soede et al. 2004), while others classify such countries in differ-
ent clusters (e.g. Gough 2001; MacMenamim 2003; Powell and Barrientos
2004).
Specifically regarding unemployment protection, the existence of a specific
model for Mediterranean countries was set out by Gallie and Paugam (2000).
Based on three indicators (coverage, average assistance and insurance benefit
expenditure per unemployed person as a percentage of GDP, and expendi-
ture on active employment policies as a percentage of GDP), and using data
from the early 1990s, the authors identified four ‘unemployment welfare
regimes’ (Gallie and Paugam 2000: 5). Our four countries are clustered into
two different models: France and Germany in the employment-centred model
(generous benefits, unequal levels of coverage and extensive active employ-
ment policies) with Spain and Portugal in the sub-protective model (low
benefits, very incomplete coverage and quasi non-existent active employment
policies). Despite this differentiation, the authors stated that ‘while the most
notable feature of [this model] is the gaps in their provision, it is possible none
the less to detect a Bismarckian influence’ (Gallie and Paugam 2000: 9).
Indeed, we argue that the very incomplete coverage of the Mediterranean
countries as well as low benefit amounts may have two reasons: the afore-
mentioned under-development of their welfare states and, particularly, their
respective labour market characteristics: high rates of temporary employment
and lower salaries in comparison with France and Germany. As we find later,
the four countries share important institutional features. Therefore, similar to
many other scholars, we propose social protection in the Mediterranean
countries merely constitutes a variant on the conservative model.
The traditional institutional features of social rights in conservative unem-
ployment insurance schemes are well identified (e.g. Kvist 1998; Clasen 2001;
Zimmermann 2006; Palier and Martin 2007): rights derived from employment
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and occupational status; access to benefits and the duration of payment
dependent upon the length of the insurance career; earnings-related benefits
and expressed by generous replacement rates with weak levels of sanctions. All
such features explain the medium level of decommodification found by
Esping-Andersen (1990). However, how many of these features have been
changed by the reform process carried out during the last 15 years? Did the
four countries present a similar reform trajectory or, on the contrary, did the
two Mediterranean countries deviate from France and Germany? We
proceed with answering these questions in the second section.
The most appropriate indicators
One important methodological option relates to selecting the most appropri-
ate indicator for measuring welfare change. This debate was first set forth by
Esping-Andersen (1990: 19), who rejected the conceptualization of welfare
states in terms of social expenditure. Since then, expenditure indicators have
come in for criticism from several authors (e.g. Pierson 1996; Korpi 2003;
Green-Pedersen 2004; Allan and Scruggs 2004; Scruggs 2006; Castles 2008).
With regard to unemployment policy, social expenditure as a GDP per-
centage presents three major limitations: expenditure rises due to increasing
levels of unemployment without any change in eligibility and entitlement
rules, with differences in either national growth rates or in the taxation of
benefits potentially distorting cross-national comparisons.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the share of unemployment
expenditure does not always correlate with the unemployment rate as dem-
onstrated below for the countries selected (table 1).
For example, in 1990, the level of unemployment expenditure showed no
expressive deviation in France and Germany, despite significantly different
unemployment rates. In 2006, expenditure on the Spanish scheme was double
that of the Portuguese scheme while the unemployment rates stood at 8.5 per
cent and 7.8 per cent respectively. In addition to the differing levels of GDP
growth, these disparities reveal very different degrees of coverage and/or
generosity.
Throughout this 17-year period, European countries faced two major
periods of economic downturn: at the beginning of the 1990s (1991–93) and in
the 2002–03 period. Rising and high unemployment rates followed in our four
countries for periods varying between four and six years. It would be expected
that unemployment expenditure experienced similar trends. However, some
figures reveal an opposite movement. The decrease in 1994, with the excep-
tion of Portugal where unemployment rates underwent a rise, is explainable
by legislative changes. The upsurge in unemployment in France and
Germany over the period 2002–04 did not lead to higher social expenditure
which may, once again, be explained by unemployment protection scheme
reforms.
From the 1990–2006 figures, we may conclude that the quantitative
measure is not the best indicator because it ignores cross-national variations
and changes over time in both the coverage and the generosity of unemploy-
ment protection schemes.
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Thus, a social rights-based approach seems a preferable alternative for
analyzing developments in any specific area of social policy and especially
unemployment protection. However, one further question remains: Which
indicator is most appropriate for measuring social rights?
First of all, there is the unemployment protection decommodification index
proposed and constructed by Esping-Andersen (1990) with the assessment of
some indicators – such as the contribution period, net replacement rate and
take up rate – which may be ‘capable of providing evidence of quite subtle
changes in the quality of social provision’ (Clegg and Clasen 2003:6). The
limitation is that this captures all changes in eligibility and entitlement criteria,
specifically all the terms and conditions of access as well as the conditions for
continuing to receive unemployment benefits.
The net replacement rate as a measure of social rights was used, for
example, by Korpi and Palme (2003) who analyzed unemployment insurance
(1975–95) in OECD countries. Compared to expenditure data, this indicator
has the advantage of not being affected by increases in the number of ben-
eficiaries but cannot capture every change in eligibility and entitlement rules
(Pallage et al. 2008: 2).
In recent years, the debate points to the main objectives of unemployment
protection having changed: the so-called passive policy became secondary
and a ‘return to work at all costs has become the paragon of social policy’
(Clasen 2000: 38). As a result, we can speak of a new nexus between social
rights and obligations (Kvist 2000: 2) that can be summarized as follows:
‘rights are no longer automatically guaranteed and are accompanied by a
whole range of incentives and sanctions’ (Zimmermann 2006: 39). There is no
Table 1
Standardized unemployment rates and unemployment expenditure as a percentage of GDP
1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 2004 2006
France
UEX/GDP 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.0
UR 8.5 11.1 11.6 10.5 8.4 9.6 9.2
Germany
UEX/GDP 1.7 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.7
UR 4.8 7.7 8.6 7.9 7.4 9.5 9.8
Portugal
UEX/GDP 0.5 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.3
UR 4.8 5.6 7.3 4.5 4.0 6.7 7.8
Spain
UEX/GDP 3.5 5.1 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6
UR 13.1 18.6 17.8 12.5 10.3 10.6 8.5
Source: Eurostat 2001, 2004, 2008a, 2008b; OECD 2005, 2006, 2008.
Notes: UEX/GDP = unemployment expenditure as % of GDP.
UR = unemployment rates.
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doubt that all the above mentioned indicators are proven and able to char-
acterize all the qualitative changes relating to eligibility, entitlement and
obligations, including sanctions.
Based on the typology approach and focused on unemployment protection,
three interesting empirical studies (Clasen et al. 2001; Clasen and Clegg 2006;
Clegg 2007) analyzed the legislative changes carried out through to 2003 in
eight European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium,
the UK, France and Belgium).
In keeping with this line of research, we base our analysis on six criteria that
encompass eligibility (qualifying period and main conditions of payment) and
entitlement (reference earnings and rates of benefits, duration of payment and
taxation), in order to characterize the direction of changes introduced over
time as well as to identify differences and similarities across the four national
schemes. The analysis is limited to legislative changes introduced in insurance
schemes within a context of full unemployment over the period 1991–2006.
This period includes 25 major reforms: France (1992, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2005 and 2006); Germany (1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and
2006); Portugal (1999, 2003 and 2006); and Spain (1992, 1994, 2001, 2002, 2004
and 2006).
We sourced our core data from the Mutual Information System on Social
Protection in the Member States of the European Union (MISSOC). The
information reported annually by the European Commission makes it pos-
sible to identify the main changes that have occurred in each country. More-
over, three further complementary sources were used: the database of the
International Reform Monitor (Portugal not included), NATLEX from the
International Labour Office (ILO), and the Social Security Databases from
the International Social Security Association.2
The Institutional Changes between 1991 and 2006
The literature concerned with the institutional design of unemployment com-
pensation usually identifies three methods of protection: an insurance system
(eligibility depends on the individual’s contribution record and benefits are
earnings-related), an assistance system (eligibility depends on means testing
and benefits are flat-rate), or a combination of these two schemes into a dual
system. In 1991, all the four countries analyzed operated a dual system. In all
insurance schemes, membership is compulsory, following the contributory
principle, which is a means of avoiding adverse selection (Kvist 1998: 40). All
countries restrict social protection to wage earners and pay the typical
earnings-related benefits.3 Next, we proceed to analyze the changes in the four
countries during the period studied in addition to the means of implementa-
tion according to the respective legal parameters and rules concerning eligi-
bility and entitlement.
Eligibility: qualifying period
The purpose of the qualifying period is to limit benefit eligibility to claimants
who fulfil certain working requirements, which may be expressed through
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three factors: a minimum work record, a relevant work period and intensity of
employment (Clasen et al. 2001). In all four countries, the work requirement
has been expressed by a minimum work record and a relevant period of
employment (table 2).
In order to facilitate the comparative analysis, as well as that of the extent
of changes, we have calculated the ratio between the first two factors men-
tioned above (Clasen et al. 2001).
In 1991, the countries were ranked as follows: Spain (0.08), Germany (0.33),
France (0.34) and Portugal (0.75). Throughout the period under review, the
picture changed in three countries, where the work requirement showed a
reverse trend:
1. in Spain (in 1992) and in Germany (only in 2004), the qualifying period
became more stringent (the ratio rose to 0.17 and 0.50, respectively);
2. in France, the work requirement registered three changes, with increases
in 1992 and 2002 (the ratio amounted 0.27, one of the more generous)
which seems to coincide with the two periods of economic crises already
mentioned.
Portugal and Spain enacted no changes.4 The increase in the work-relatedness
resulting from reforms in other European countries (for example, the UK,
Netherlands, Belgium and Finland) is only evident in Germany and Spain.
Eligibility: the main payment conditions
In 1991, the four insurance schemes all required claimants to be involuntarily
unemployed, registered at a public employment office and capable of, and
available for, work. However, the conditions necessary to qualify for unem-
ployment insurance, including conditions for continuing to receive a benefit
became progressively more restrictive.
Table 2
Qualifying period under the insurance scheme
1991 1992 2001 2002 2004
FR 3 M in last
8 M
4 M in last
8 M
4 M in last
18 M
6 M in last
22 M
–
DE 12 M in last
3 Y
– – – 12 M in last
2Y
PT 18 M in
last 2 Y
– – – –
SP 6 M in last
6 Y
12 M in last
6 Y
– – –
Source: MISSOC (several years); ILO 2007; ISSA 2008.
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Stricter definitions of availability for work in relation to active job-seeking and
acceptance of job offers (definition of a suitable job and geographical mobility
rules) were introduced into all four insurance schemes.
In the late-1990s – as was the case of Germany, in 1998 – and after 2001,
individual activity requirements were reinforced by re-integration contracts,
including mandatory participation in labour market programmes (e.g. OECD
2000, 2005, 2007). In all countries, personalized re-integration contracts
became a ‘tool to enforce the eligibility criteria so that unemployment benefit
conditionality has become stricter over time’ (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl
2008: 10) with unemployment compensation becoming a kind of assistance in
returning to work and a reward for active job seeking. The PARE (Plan d’Aide
au Retour l’Emploi), initiated in France in 2001, represents one good example: all
newly unemployed citizens were required to subscribe to the programme to
qualify for benefits. However, some diversity is observed between countries
(OECD 2007) and we find two distinct situations in the unemployment action
plans put into practice:
1. after registration at an employment office (Germany and France);
2. three (or six) months in the case of youths or six (or 12) months in the case
of adults after registration (Portugal and Spain, respectively).
In all countries, these obligations have been accompanied by a more intensive
monitoring of individual jobseeker activities, particularly contacts with
employment offices as well as tougher sanctions on those rejecting training
courses or job offers.5 Once again, there are very sharp variations among
countries. For example, the sanction for a first refusal may be the suspension
of unemployment benefit as from 12 weeks (Germany) to three months
(France and Portugal) or a definitive exclusion (Spain). However, it is very
difficult to access how these punitive sanctions are implemented in practice
(OECD 2005).
Observed together, these measures can be classified as a major change in
unemployment protection. Indeed, even if almost no other legal parameters
had been altered, the greater emphasis on obligations (and consequently
sanctions) weakened the traditional relationship between contribution and
eligibility requirements. Moreover, this new conditionality may have forced
unemployed people to accept even very low paid jobs that moved them down
onto a lower level of social protection.
Entitlement: reference earnings and rates of benefits
We now turn to the factors that determine the amount of unemployment
insurance benefits, i.e. the (gross) rates of replacement (table 3) and the earn-
ings taken as reference (table 4).
A system of rates is used by three countries: in Germany, the rates vary
according to family status (better for claimants with children), while in France
and Spain, the rate decreases according to the length of unemployment
(better for short-term unemployment). We find that in 1991 the replacement
rate varied between 57.4 per cent (France) and 80 per cent (Spain). Depending
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on the taxation system and incidence of social contributions, the gross and net
rate of replacement may or may not coincide. In 1991, unemployment benefits
in Germany, Portugal and Spain were subject to neither tax nor social
contributions. France was the only country where benefits were subject to
taxation (after a deduction) and social contributions which made the
aforementioned gross rate less generous.
In respect of the earnings taken as reference, we find wide diversity in the
time period over which benefit calculations were based (table 4). In 1991, it
varied between three months (Germany) and 12 months (Portugal and
France).
In addition, the setting of a maximum benefit amount (and/or a minimum)
must be analyzed, because it ‘breaches significantly the principle of equiva-
lence or reciprocity i.e. the correspondence between contributions and benefit
(Clasen 2001: 645). In Portugal and Spain, a maximum and a minimum
amount are set; the Spanish scheme has a special feature, i.e. the minimum
Table 3
Rates of unemployment insurance benefits
1991 1992 1996 1997 2001
FR 40.4% + a flat
rate or 57.4%
within a limit
of 75%
Downward
sliding scale:
the full rate is
decreased
every 4 M
Downward
sliding scale:
the full rate is
decreased
every 6 M
– Fixed
scale
DE 68% or 63%
(no children)
– 67% or 60%
(no children)
PT 65% – – – –
SP 80% or 70%
(after 6 M)
70% or 60%
(after 6 M)
– – –
Source: MISSOC (several years); ILO 2007; ISSA 2008.
Table 4
Earnings taken as insurance scheme references
1991 1994 1995
FR last 12 M – –
DE last 3 M last 6 M last 12 M
PT 12 M preceding the 2 M prior to unemployment – –
SP last 6 M – –
Source: MISSOC (several years); ILO 2007; ISSA 2008.
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amount varies according to the number of dependent children. In France,
there was only a minimum amount.
Over the period under review, none of the structural features of the insur-
ance scheme was altered. However, we can identify some trends towards a
new direction:
1. in Germany, the time period used to calculate the benefit was increased
twice (in 1994 and 1995) and the benefit rates were decreased in 1996,
which produced a double effect towards a more restrictive entitlement,
i.e. lower benefits;
2. in France, the sliding scale of benefits introduced in 1992 was abandoned
in 2001; in terms of the amount of benefit, the new fixed scale penalizes
longer spells of unemployment less than its predecessor; and
3. in Spain, the maximum benefit became variable according to the
number of children (170 per cent, 195 per cent or 220 per cent of the
minimum wage), replacing the previous single rate (220 per cent of
the minimum wage), and the gross rates of replacement were reduced to
70 per cent and 60 per cent, which translates into lower benefits for
beneficiaries with few or no dependent children; after 1994, and follow-
ing the French example, the benefits became subject to tax and social
security contributions.
Entitlement: duration of payment
With regard to the duration of benefit payments, one of two principles are
applied to insurance schemes: a fixed period or a variable maximum period
which may be dependent on labour market status (the individual’s employ-
ment record) and/or the personal status (age) (Kvist 1998: 48).
In 1991, all the countries operated with variable periods but with different
determining factors:
1. in France and Germany, the duration was positively related to the
working record and age;
2. in Spain, the duration depended on the length of insurance; and
3. in Portugal, age was the guiding principle. Over the period, Portugal
joined the first cluster (table 5).
In 1991, there was significant diversity in the duration of insurance benefits,
especially in terms of the maximum duration with France running the most
generous scheme and Spain the least. Over the period, payment durations
have been successively but differently changed in three countries. Some con-
vergence is observable in the maximum duration, which has been reduced in
all three countries (twice in France and Germany), while the minimum dura-
tion has undergone an opposite change in France (increased) and Portugal
(decreased). Some general trends may also be highlighted:
1. in all countries, the working record has become increasingly important in
determining the payment duration (minimum and maximum);
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2. the duration has been tightened for older unemployed people in conjunc-
tion with a less favourable change for those with longer insurance records.
What Has Been Changed and How?
There is some evidence that the four selected countries have made changes to
their unemployment protection schemes. Table 6 presents their directions by
year and item.
The changes introduced in the four insurance schemes reveal restrictions in
eligibility and entitlement criteria, although to different extents and with
differing mixes of instruments. However, a common trend to all countries is
highlighted: eligibility has been tightened by means of more restrictive
payment conditions, mostly tighter claimant obligations.
Relating the mix of measures, France and Germany introduced legislative
changes in almost all items concerning eligibility and entitlement. In contrast,
Portugal has used the lowest number of instruments. Other differences among
the four countries can be highlighted. In comparison with France, the mea-
sures adopted in Germany throughout this period were clearly oriented to a
more restricted eligibility and lower generosity. In the case of France, expan-
sive measures were implemented in 1996 and 2001.
In addition to the smaller number of measures taken, in comparison with
Spain, Portugal presented an important difference as regards the timing of
reforms: while Spain implemented an important mix of legislative changes (all
Table 5
Duration of payment: insurance schemes
1993 1995 1999 2002 2004 2006
FR M: 4 to 60
insurance
work and
age
M: 7 to 42 M: 7 to 36
DE M: 6 to 32
insurance
work and
age
Shorter
duration
for older
unemployed
M: 6 to 24
PT M: 10 to 30
age
M: 12 to 30 M: 9 to 24
age and
insurance
work
SP M: 4 to 24
insurance
work
Source: MISSOC (several years); ILO 2007; ISSA 2008.
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restrictive in nature) between 1992 and 1994, Portugal undertook its first
reform of unemployment protection (aimed at higher coverage and generos-
ity) in 1999. Restrictive measures were only introduced in the Portuguese
insurance scheme from 2001 onwards. Two reasons justify this difference in
the timing of reforms:
1. the high rates of unemployment and consequent high social spending in
Spain in the early 90s;
2. the lowest degree of coverage in the Portuguese insurance scheme as
compared with the former.
Regarding the characterization of reform trajectories, two conclusions stand
out:
1. France and Germany recorded a trajectory very similar in terms of both
the number of reform measures and their timing;
2. the two Mediterranean countries displayed different trajectories, Spain
closer to other continental countries and Portugal with a very specific
‘agenda’.
As regards identifying the respective trajectories over time, the unemployment
reforms carried out by the four countries point to confirmation of the two
already discussed stages in welfare reform. Between 1991 and 1997, all coun-
tries, with the exception of Portugal, implemented legislative changes relating
to the qualifying period, earnings references and replacement rates, duration
of payments and incidence of taxation. This first wave of reforms seems clearly
justified by concerns over controlling social expenditure and cost-containment
more generally, deriving from the Maastricht process.
In the second wave of reforms, from 2001 onwards, all countries placed the
emphasis on stricter eligibility requirements and on the activation of unem-
ployed people through stronger individual behaviour requirements, more
monitoring and punitive sanctions. These political options, which clearly
demonstrate lesser tolerance of long-term benefit dependency, may have their
rationale based upon the potential of work disincentives. Indeed, this new
conditionality may have a larger impact on unemployed behaviour than
changes to all other entitlements and eligibility criteria: when an unemployed
citizen becomes ineligible for benefits, the replacement rate falls to zero
(OECD 2000: 131).
Conclusion
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, focusing on unemployment insur-
ance schemes, the article analyzed the legislative changes concerning eligibil-
ity and entitlement criteria carried out over the 1991–2006 period in four
countries (France, Germany, Portugal and Spain) in order to validate or
dismiss the hypothesis that the reform process may have led to a new balance
characterized by weaker social rights and stronger obligations. Second, the
article sought to verify whether or not there was a common reform trajectory
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in time as well as in space given the known divergence over the classification
of Mediterranean countries under a specific regime.
Analysis of the 25 legislative changes confirms the two reform agenda
dimensions (cost-containment and the recalibration of benefit rights) identi-
fied by Clegg (2006). However, two issues must be highlighted. First, only two
countries have chosen to reduce the generosity of benefits: Germany, where
the rates of replacement were reduced in 1995 and the time period used
to calculate benefits was increased in 1997, and Spain, which first cut
Table 6
Direction of changes
Year Eligibility Entitlement
Qualifying
period
Terms of
payment
Reference
Earnings
Rates Duration Tax and SC
incidence
1992 FR (+R) FR (-G)
SP (+R) SP (-G)
1993
1994 DE (-G) SP (-G)
1995 DE (-G) DE (-G) (a)
1996 FR (+G)
1997 DE (-G)
1998 DE (+R)
1999 PT (+G) (b)
2000
2001 FR (-R) FR (+R) FR (+G)
SP (+R)
2002 FR (+R) DE (+R) FR (G) (c)
SP (+R)
2003 FR (+R)
DE (+R)
PT (+R)
2004 DE (+R) DE (+R) DE (-G) (a)
SP (+R)
2005 FR (+R)
DE (+R)
2006 FR (+R) FR (-G) (a)
DE (+R)
PT (+R) PT (-G) (d)
SP (+R)
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Notes: R = restrictive; G = generous; + = more; - = less.
(a) For older unemployed.
(b) Increase in the minimum duration.
(c) Increase and decrease in the minimum and maximum duration, respectively.
(d) Decrease in the minimum and maximum duration.
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replacement rates in 1992 and then subjected them to tax and social contri-
butions in 1994.
Second, access to unemployment insurance, including eligibility for con-
tinued receipt of benefit, became progressively more restrictive in all four
countries, from 2001 onwards. In addition to a more stringent qualifying
period in Germany (2004 reform) and a reduction in payment duration in
Germany (2004 reform), Portugal and France (2006 reforms), beneficiary
obligations have been heavily reinforced in all countries during the second
wave of reforms. The new obligations have been accompanied by a more
intensive monitoring of individual jobseeker activities as well as by tougher
sanctions on those refusing re-qualification activities or job offers. Such
political options seem to confirm the hypothesis of a new balance between
weaker social rights and stronger obligations. As mentioned above, the four
insurance schemes, as representatives of the conservative welfare regime,
would grant unemployment protection based on the contributory principle,
i.e. access was dependent on prior contributions and payment durations
varied according to the individual’s insurance career. Not only do we
observe a reinforcement of the work-relatedness principle, a trend already
found in some other countries before 2003 (Clasen and Clegg 2006; Clegg
2007), but we furthermore identify a new conditionality in terms of the right
to protection. Indeed, the receipt of insurance benefits has become strictly
dependent on actively searching for work, which may, in turn, reveal a
reconstruction of social protection on the basis of future work prospects
(Erhel and Zajdela 2004).
There is no doubt that the return to work strategy adopted in all countries
‘has taken the lead over social protection of the worker in terms of objectives’
(Clasen 2000: 38), regardless of empirical evidence that beneficiaries, mainly
in more vulnerable groups, have been moved to low-paid and temporary jobs.
Moreover, the consequences of efforts to restrict the alternatives to participa-
tion in the labour market may reflect a trend towards recommodification
(Green-Pedersen 2001; Lindbom 2002), which fosters negative consequences:
the exclusion of unemployed individuals for reasons unrelated to their per-
sonal circumstances or efforts, such as persistent unemployment and low levels
of job creation.
As regards the second purpose of this article, the identification, or other-
wise, of a common reform trajectory in time and in space, conclusions can also
be drawn.
Regarding the first issue, we may conclude that no Mediterranean cluster
was identified. Indeed, the two countries presented different trajectories
with Spain closer to the other continental countries, which recorded very
similar trajectories, and Portugal following its own very specific ‘agenda’.
Furthermore, the reform processes carried out by the four countries do
seem to confirm the existence of two main stages to welfare reform: a first
wave, between 1991 and 1997, when all countries with the exception of
Portugal implemented legislative changes clearly reflecting concerns over
cost-containment. Subsequently, a second wave of reforms, from 2001
onwards, has been characterized by a stronger recalibration of rights and
obligations.
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Notes
1. Taylor-Gooby analyzed attitude survey data (1985–96) in Sweden, Germany and
the UK as representatives of the three regime types proposed by Esping-Andersen.
2. The International Reform Monitor is a project carried out by the Bertelsmann
Foundation, which provides online information on social policy in 15 OECD
countries (Portugal not included). The ILO’s NATLEX database provides
abstracts of legislation.
3. In all countries, unemployed persons can claim unemployment assistance benefits
when they are not eligible for insurance benefits or have exhausted entitlements to
insurance benefits.
4. In Portugal, the creation of the Employment and Social Protection Programme,
which included special (and temporary) measures for new claimants from March
2003, had no effect on the ratio. For more details, see MISSOC-Info 01/2004.
5. For more detailed analysis of activation policies, see, for example, Clasen (2002:
Part C, pp. 197–255), Barbier and Ludwing-Mayerhofer (2004) and Dingeldey
(2007).
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